Tag: Vietnam War

On Doctrine – Harry G. Summers Jr.

Synopsis:

In his analysis of the Vietnam War, Harry G. Summers Jr. advances the notion of American strategy as doctrinally deficient via a cloud of confusion. Following the Korean War, the definition of limited war became increasingly fluid. In this way, means and ends became confused – which tended to influence all levels of war.

Excerpts:

“In World War II this linkage dropped out of our war theories, for the national aim was no longer forcing the enemy ‘to sue for peace’ but rather his unconditional surrender. The destruction of the enemy’s armed forces were therefore no longer means to an end so much as an end in itself.

“The U.S. strategy in Korea after the Chinese intervention was not so much one of limiting the means as it was one of tailoring the political ends so that they could be accomplished within the military means that our political leaders were willing to expend.

“Defining victory only in terms of total victory, rather than more accurately as the attainment of the objectives for which the war is waged, was a strategic mistake.

“But even though we dropped victory as an aim in war, the overall doctrinal effects of our Korean war experience were beneficial. As a result of that war we shed our World War II delusions about total war.

“In like manner the polarity with China was also weakened by our publicly expressed fears of becoming involved in a land war in Asia. This lack of polarity was to lead us into an untenable strategic position where the enemy’s territory was inviolable while the territory of our ally was open to attack.

*All excerpts have been taken from On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio Press.

American Strategy in Vietnam – Bruce Palmer Jr.

Synopsis:

As a member of the American high command in Vietnam, Bruce Palmer Jr. offers his analysis on the shortcomings of American strategy in the war. According to Palmer, influence from initial assumptive errors menaced the efficacy of ways/means vis-à-vis American ends. By comparison, North Vietnamese strategic assumptions cohesively synthesized with desired ends.

Excerpts:

“The United States was overconfident in believing that superior U.S. technology, Yankee ingenuity, industrial and military might, modern military organization, tactics, and techniques, and a tradition of crisis solving in peace and war would surely bring success in Vietnam where the French had failed.

“The limitation of the war zone meant that there was no practical way to stop the infiltration of men and materiel into South Vietnam. Air interdiction throughout North Vietnam and in the panhandle of Laos could inflict personnel and materiel losses, but predictably could not stop the flow. South Vietnam was virtually impossible to seal off.

“President Johnson beginning in 1965 let it be known to North Vietnamese leaders that the United States did not intend to invade North Vietnam or otherwise try to bring down the Hanoi government. Thereafter U.S. actions without exception reaffirmed that impression of U.S. intent. This practically sealed South Vietnam’s doom, for it allowed Hanoi complete freedom to employ all its forces in the South.

“Perhaps most serious was that, engrossed in U.S. operations, we paid insufficient attention to our number one military job, which was to develop South Vietnamese armed forces that could successfully pacify and defend their own country… By the time the United States changed direction and gave South Vietnamese forces top priority, it was too late. American popular support had been frittered away.

“The question for Hanoi was whether to continue to seek a quick collapse before the Americans could turn the South Vietnamese around, or to settle down for a more protracted struggle. Hanoi’s answer appears to have been to plan and prepare for a long war but at the same time to be ready to exploit any possibility of early success. At the heart of the subversion in the South was a healthy political structure, the shadow government of the Viet Cong, operating at every level.

*All excerpts have been taken from The 25 Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam, Da Capo Press.

The Confusion Between Tactics and Strategy in Vietnam – Harry G. Summers Jr.

Synopsis:

The American affection for the operational art vis-à-vis warfighting became obvious during the Vietnam War. Without the strategic character of the conflict rightly defined, military planners – as well as policy makers – tended to confuse the strategic dimensions of ways, means, and ends. In his book on the conflict, Harry G. Summers Jr. analyzes the initial assumptive error, as well as the corresponding strategic confusion which followed.

Excerpts:

“Instead of orienting on North Vietnam – the source of war – we turned our attention to the symptom – the guerrilla war in the south. Our new ‘strategy’ of counterinsurgency blinded us to the fact that the guerrilla war was tactical and not strategic.

“Basic to the success of a strategic defensive in pursuit of the negative aim, therefore, is the assumption that time is on your side. But the longer the war progressed the more obvious it became that time was not on our side.

“Because it did not focus on the political aim to be achieved – containment of North Vietnamese expansion – our so-called strategy was never a strategy at all. At best it could be called a kind of grand tactics.

“Since the insurgency itself was a tactical screen masking North Vietnam’s real objectives (the conquest of South Vietnam), our counterinsurgency operations could only be tactical, no matter what we called them.

“Our failure as military professionals to judge the true nature of the Vietnam war had a profound effect. It resulted in confusion throughout the national security establishment over tactics, grand tactics and strategy, a confusion that continues to this day.

*All excerpts have been taken from On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio Press.

The Vietnam Syndrome – Richard Nixon

Synopsis:

The Real War presents Richard Nixon’s strategic philosophy for the Cold War. His chapter ‘The Vietnam Syndrome’ keenly describes the cerebral influence the Vietnam War had on America, and its allies. The chapter also offers Nixon’s perspective on how the Vietnam War was directed before he became president, as well as presenting his own objectives for the war while he was president.

Excerpts:

“If South Vietnam had only had to contend with invasion and infiltration from the North across the forty-mile-long DMZ, it could have done so without the assistance of American forces… But Hanoi was able to use sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia as staging grounds for its assault on South Vietnam. In addition to making hit-and-run tactics possible, these lengthened the border the South had to defend from 40 to 640 miles, not counting indentations.

“Diem’s fall was followed by political instability and chaos in South Vietnam, and the event had repercussions all over Asia as well. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan told me a few months later, ‘Diem’s murder meant three things to many Asian leaders: that it is dangerous to be a friend of the United States; that it pays to be neutral; and that sometimes it helps to be an enemy.

“We tried to wage a conventional war against an enemy who was fighting an unconventional war. We tried to mold the South Vietnamese Army into a large-scale conventional force while the principal threat was still from guerrilla forces, which called for the sort of smaller-unit, local-force response that had proved so successful in Malaya. American military policy-makers tended to downplay the subtler political and psychological aspects of guerrilla war, trying instead to win by throwing massive quantities of men and arms at the objective. And then, the impact even of this was diluted by increasing American pressure gradually rather than suddenly, thus giving the enemy time to adapt.

“At the heart of the Nixon Doctrine is the premise that countries threatened by communist aggression must take the primary responsibility for their own defense. This does not mean that U.S. forces have no military role; what it does mean is that threatened countries have to be willing to bear the primary burden of supplying the manpower.

“After their decisive defeat on the ground by South Vietnamese forces in the spring offensive and the destruction of their war-making capabilities by the December bombing, the North Vietnamese knew that militarily they were up against almost impossible odds. As the South Vietnamese economy continued to prosper far more than that of the North, Hanoi’s communist ideology had less and less appeal. Thieu’s Land to the Tiller program, for example, had reduced tenancy from 60 to 7 percent by 1973, a truly revolutionary development that undercut the communists’ argument that the government allied itself with the rich and oppressed the people. Also, the North Vietnamese knew that both the Soviets and the Chinese had a stake in their new relationship with us and might not be willing to endanger that relationship by providing military supplies in excess of those allowed by the Paris peace agreement of January 1973.

*All excerpts have been taken from The Real War, Warner Books Inc.