Military Failure in Vietnam – Edward Luttwak

Synopsis:

According to Edward Luttwak, Top-down institutional dispersion of the ways as well as means of warfighting among the service branches tended to increase fog and friction for American forces during the Vietnam War. Further, the dispersion advanced competing operational assumptions and ends vis-à-vis American strategy – which decreased overall cohesion. Finally, Luttwak blames top-down bureaucratic so-called ‘self-indulgence’ for eroding American strategic dexterity via continuous expansion.

Excerpts:

“By 1968 there were 110 generals and admirals actually in Vietnam, 64 of them for the Army alone; a small number were actually in command of forces in the field, but most were in Saigon, along with hundreds and hundreds of colonels.

“In practice, however, there was no single and coherent strategy that would select the appropriate force for each time and place. Instead there was only the unified command system, which parceled out the territory and the targets ‘equitably’ and then allowed each element to carry out its own standard operations, appropriate or not.

“But when there are many strategies, there is no strategy – in Vietnam then, as in the making of peacetime military policy in Washington till now. So it was that institutional self-indulgence deprived the United States of any true chance of success. Indochina was full of trees and brave men, and mere force unguided by strategy could not prevail.

“The country gave its men to be soldiers, but the system turned them into clerks and valets, mechanics and storekeepers, in huge and disproportionate numbers.

“But American lives were in danger, because a war was being fought; the best way of ending the casualties was to win the war, and that could be done only by successful tactics that would implement successful operational schemes derived from a successful strategy.

*All excerpts have been taken from The Pentagon and the Art of War, Simon and Schuster, Inc.

Chronicle of the Fourth Crusade and the Conquest of Constantinople – Geoffrey de Villehardouin

Synopsis:

In his Chronicle of the Fourth Crusade and the Conquest of Constantinople, Geoffrey de Villehardouin relates his first-hand account of the evolution of the Fourth Crusade from its original destination of Cairo in Egypt to its eventual conquest of the Christian city of Constantinople. Villehardouin served as a member of the high command of the crusade, and the narrative is written as an attempt to justify its actions. Finally, during this era of Byzantine history, Constantinople’s population was perhaps 500,000 inhabitants or more – and Villehardouin recounts amazement at the magnitude as well as opulence of the city.

Excerpts:

“Now you may know that those who had never before seen Constantinople looked upon it very earnestly, for they never thought there could be in all the world so rich a city; and they marked the high walls and strong towers that enclosed it round about, and the rich palaces, and mighty churches of which there were so many that no one would have believed it who had not seen it with his eyes-and the height and the length of that city which above all others was sovereign. And be it known to you, that no man there was of such hardihood but his flesh trembled: and it was no wonder, for never was so great an enterprise undertaken by any people since the creation of the world.

“The Marquis Boniface of Montferrat rode all along the shore to the palace of Bucoleon, and when he arrived there it surrendered, on condition that the lives of all therein should be spared. At Bucoleon were found the larger number of the great ladies who had fled to the castle, for there were found the sister (Agnes, sister of Philip Augustus, married successively to Alexius II, to Andronicus, and to Theodore Branas) of the King of France, who had been empress, and the sister (Margaret, sister of Emeric, King of Hungary, married to the Emperor Isaac, and afterwards to the Marquis of Montferrat) of the King of Hungary, who had also been empress, and other ladies very many. Of the treasure that was found in that palace I cannot well speak, for there was so much that it was beyond end or counting.

“…And the other people, spread abroad throughout the city, also gained much booty. The booty gained was so great that none could tell you the end of it: gold and silver, and vessels and precious stones, and samite, and cloth of silk, and robes vair and grey, and ermine, and every choicest thing found upon the earth. And well does Geoffrey of Villehardouin the Marshal of Champagne, bear witness, that never, since the world was created, had so much booty been won in any city.

“So the host of the pilgrims and of the Venetians found quarters, and greatly did they rejoice and give thanks because of the victory God had vouchsafed to them for those who before had been poor were now in wealth and luxury…And well might they praise our Lord, since in all the host there were no more than twenty thousand armed men, one with another, and with the help of God they had conquered four hundred thousand men, or more, and in the strongest city in all the world – yea, a great city – and very well fortified.

“Well may you be assured that the spoil was very great, for if it had not been for what was stolen and for the part given to the Venetians, there would have been at least four hundred thousand marks of silver and at least ten thousand horses one with another. Thus were divided the spoils of Constantinople, as you have heard.

*All excerpts have been taken from Chronicle of the Fourth Crusade and the Conquest of Constantinople, A Public Domain Book.

On Institutional Order – G. John Ikenberry

Synopsis:

G. John Ikenberry tends to define institutional order vis-à-vis a tri-causal dynamic. First, a hegemonic power advances a postwar international order using consent and consensus networks. Second, the networks bind institutions via a process of ‘consultation and participation’ – which crystalizes over time. Finally, the leading power locks in favorable – as well as credible – arrangements, which extend beyond its power zenith.

Excerpts:

“The greater the postwar disparities in power, the more opportunities the leading state has to lock in a favorable order, and the more weaker and secondary states will be attracted to institutional agreements that lower the risks of domination or abandonment.

“A second reason why weaker states might opt for the institutional agreement is that if the leading state is able credibly to demonstrate strategic restraint the others buy protection against the threat of domination or abandonment.

“The constitutional settlement involves a bargain: the leading state gets a predictable and legitimate order based on agreed-upon rules and institutions. It obtains the acquiescence in this order by weaker states, which in turn allows it to conserve its power.

“Institutional agreements do shape and constrain the policy options of states and put some general parameters on the distribution of gains; indeed, this is why ordering institutions are attractive to both leading and weaker states.

“Binding institutions create constraints on the way power can be used in the system, thereby rendering asymmetric power relations less exploitative and commitment more certain. The returns to power are reduced.

*All excerpts have been taken from After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, & the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton University Press.

Delenda Carthago – Adrian Goldsworthy

Synopsis:

Roman political posturing between the Second and Third Punic Wars magnified the existential peril of the Carthaginian state. Adrian Goldsworthy devotes a chapter of his book on the Punic Wars to the political and military history of this interwar period, as well as its final outcome.

Excerpts:

“The Carthaginians had proved consistently loyal allies of Rome since 201. They had supplied Roman armies with grain and in 191 sent half of their tiny navy to join the fleet operating against Antiochus III. Aided by Hannibal’s reform of the State’s finances, the annual indemnity had been paid regularly until its completion in 151. In the series of boundary disputes with Masinissa’s Numidia, Carthage had submitted to Roman arbitration, even though this had always openly or tacitly favoured the king.

“It is unclear whether or not the renewed prosperity of the city resulted in some rearmament, since although our literary sources claim that this was not so, the excavations in the naval harbour suggest otherwise. What is certain is that in the middle of the century the Carthaginians were in no position to launch a serious offensive against Rome, even if they had wanted to. Even so, it is clear that the Romans were increasingly afraid of their ally at this very period.

“The traditions of Punic warfare did not expect a defeated state, especially one which had not been conquered and absorbed, to remain forever subject to the victor. Only the Romans thought in this way. No longer were the Carthaginians unambiguously dependent allies of Rome. That a former enemy, and one who had pushed Rome to the brink of utter defeat, was once again strong and independent immediately turned her back into a threat. This was the root of the Romans’ rising fear of Carthage.

“The defeats suffered in Spain highlighted the inexperience of most Roman armies. The annual replacement of provincial governors and the rarity of pro-magistracies encouraged commanders to seek glory before they were replaced, and denied them the time necessary to turn their soldiers into an effective army. This mattered far less in the early part of the century when the quality of Rome’s manpower had been higher.

“Another prominent senator, Scipio Nasica, matched Cato by ending his own speeches with the view that Carthage should be preserved. It is claimed that he believed the presence of a strong rival would preserve the Romans’ virtue intact, an argument which became a continual lament in the next century when Rome was plunged into a series of civil wars. At the time few Romans seem to have agreed with him.

*All excerpts have been taken from The Fall of Carthage, Orion Books Ltd.

Hannibal at Cannae – Ardant du Picq

Synopsis:

Morale, and professionalism underscore Ardant du Picq’s analysis of Hannibal’s generalship at Cannae. According to du Picq, Hannibal’s scheme of maneuver demanded a high degree of professionalism to operate effectively. Further, confidence in Hannibal’s command acted as a cohesive glue for the disparate components of the Carthaginian force.

Excerpts:

“It seems that victory is not enough for Hannibal: he wants destruction, and he always aims to cut off all retreat for the enemy. He knows well that, with Rome, destruction was the only way to finish.

“He does not believe in the desperate courage of the masses; he believes in terror, and he knows the value of improvisation to inspire it.

“Who before Hannibal or after had lost as many as the Romans and was still victorious? To keep troops fighting on until victory ensues, with so many casualties, requires a very powerful hand. He inspired his subjects with absolute confidence.

“To inspire his followers with such confidence, Hannibal had to explain his plan of action before the engagement in such a way that treachery could not harm him. He must have warned them that the center could be penetrated, but that he was not worried about it because it was an expected and prepared action.

“Hannibal was certainly the greatest general of antiquity because of his admirable understanding of the morale of combat, of the morale of the soldier, his own or the enemy’s.

*All excerpts have been taken from Battle Studies, University Press of Kansas.

On Doctrine – Harry G. Summers Jr.

Synopsis:

In his analysis of the Vietnam War, Harry G. Summers Jr. advances the notion of American strategy as doctrinally deficient via a cloud of confusion. Following the Korean War, the definition of limited war became increasingly fluid. In this way, means and ends became confused – which tended to influence all levels of war.

Excerpts:

“In World War II this linkage dropped out of our war theories, for the national aim was no longer forcing the enemy ‘to sue for peace’ but rather his unconditional surrender. The destruction of the enemy’s armed forces were therefore no longer means to an end so much as an end in itself.

“The U.S. strategy in Korea after the Chinese intervention was not so much one of limiting the means as it was one of tailoring the political ends so that they could be accomplished within the military means that our political leaders were willing to expend.

“Defining victory only in terms of total victory, rather than more accurately as the attainment of the objectives for which the war is waged, was a strategic mistake.

“But even though we dropped victory as an aim in war, the overall doctrinal effects of our Korean war experience were beneficial. As a result of that war we shed our World War II delusions about total war.

“In like manner the polarity with China was also weakened by our publicly expressed fears of becoming involved in a land war in Asia. This lack of polarity was to lead us into an untenable strategic position where the enemy’s territory was inviolable while the territory of our ally was open to attack.

*All excerpts have been taken from On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio Press.

Horses and Hoplites – John France

Synopsis:

Perilous Glory chronicles the ascendancy of Western military power in world history. Military historian John France dedicates a chapter of his book to a comparison of the competing styles of warfare of the ancient Greeks and Persians. Both styles of warfare were well adapted to distinct geographical settings, and both were notably hamstrung operating outside of those settings. The Persian military relied on cavalry mobility whereas their Greek counterparts utilized heavy infantry hoplites.

Excerpts:

“Like almost all who wrote about war, Greek writers, Herodotus amongst them, liked to emphasise its noble aspect: the valour of the hoplite, fighting honourably face to face and breast to breast against his enemies. They preferred to forget the sneaking around to surprise and destroy villages and cities, the bullying of peasants and the squalid destruction of their crops.

“Bloody though hoplite confrontations were, it has been suggested that the citizens perceived them as a rapid and efficient way of settling quarrels between states, and certainly better than drawn-out struggles in which severe long-term harm to the countryside and city might get out of hand. Moreover, the brutal violence of this clash of arms with its rigid subordination of the individual to the collective mass was possible because the citizens had agreed to this style of war and thus were bound to it by public commitment.

“For the Delian League became an Athenian empire. Athens meddled in the politics of the Delian cities to favour democratic regimes, and planted colonies of Athenians in their lands where they formed military bases. The tributes from the League and the taxes upon foreigners trading with Athens created enormous incomes which could be used to pay towers for the fleet and to support strong armies. Here was the Athenian culture of leisure and greed at work.

“The Persian wars and then the long quarrels of the Greek city-states created a kind of military laboratory in Greece, stimulating ideas and new developments. The most obvious effect of this was the development of the hoplite phalanx. It became the very embodiment of close-order, a tight mass of men working together, able to resist enemies with their hedgehog of spears and to threaten them by sheer weight and momentum. However, this was only really achieved as the citizen-soldier was superseded by the professional soldier.

“The Greek front was not all that vital to the Persian Empire, and it managed to regain Anatolia by an adroit diplomacy which exploited the quarrels of the Greeks. The priority for the Persian Empire was speed of movement and the ability to fight in other places, especially on the long Asian frontiers where cavalry was the most useful arm. No power can be strong everywhere and in every aspect of war, and the Persian army was no exception to this general rule. And when they wanted heavy infantry, they could always hire them at need from the quarrelsome city-states of Greece whose mercenaries were perfectly willing to serve for money.

*All excerpts have been taken from Perilous Glory: The Rise of Western Military Power, Yale University Press.

Presidential Power – Richard Nixon

Synopsis:

Diplomacy signals the sine qua non of Richard Nixon’s vision of presidential power. Within Nixon’s diplomatic power construct, unpredictability, informal negotiations, as well as so-called linkage tend to sub-unify and amplify presidential power-projection vis-à-vis international politics. Similarly, Nixon advances ten diplomatic guide-posts to anchor presidential power.

Excerpts:

“When saying ‘always’ and ‘never,’ always keep a mental reservation; never foreclose the unique exception; always leave room for maneuver. ‘Always’ and ‘never’ are guideposts, but in high-stakes diplomacy there are few immutables. A President always has to be prepared for what he thought he would never do.

“Diplomacy often requires a delicate and intricate balancing of ambiguity and straight talk, the unpredictable and the very predictable. A complex game is played out between adversaries, a game that involves, or should involve, the least amount of guesswork on the part of the other side.

“The United States is an open society. We have all but one of our cards face up on the table. Our only covered card is the will, nerve, and unpredictability of the President – his ability to make the enemy think twice about raising the ante.

“Diplomacy can be used either as a sword or as a needle – as a weapon or an instrument of union. In dealing with allies the President is chiefly engaged in mending tears and strengthening seams.

“The difference between meeting with friends and meeting with adversaries can best be summarized this way. When you talk to your adversaries you learn about them. When you talk to your friends you learn from them.

*All excerpts have been taken from The Real War, Warner Books Inc.

The Rise of Constantius III – Michael Kulikowski

Synopsis:

The elevation – and subsequent domination – of the late Roman Empire by Constantius III came about within the context of a power vacuum generated by the execution of the Roman generalissimo Stilicho. Successful in several campaigns in Spain and Gaul, Constantius – for a time – managed to restore Roman power-projection in both domains. Later, he shared power with Honorius as co-emperor.

Excerpts:

“Disease had rid Honorius of one of his chief tormentors, but it was a new arrival in the regime who delivered him from the still more pressing challenge of Constantine in Gaul. Flavius Constantius, who would dominate the next decade of western Roman history in much the same way that Stilicho had the last, was a native of Naissus.

“He played no documented role in the chaos before and after Stilicho’s execution, and emerges on the scene only in 410, perhaps as comesdomesticorum, when he orchestrated the second fall of Olympius and had him clubbed to death. Constantius was then elevated to the magisterium utriusque militiae, senior commander of the praesental army.

“In places where the imperial superstructure was restored, as it was in much of Gaul and Spain, the period of local autonomy looked like an unfortunate interlude; in places where it was not, it was remembered as a popular revolt against Rome.

“For a very brief moment, Honorius was the sole person claiming the western throne. That was in itself a triumph at this point, but the successive proclamations in most of the western dioceses revealed a pattern of entrenched warlordism that would characterise the rest of the fifth century.

“Constantius had every reason to be well pleased. He was now clearly the dominant power in the state, and the fact that we know so little about the court factions surrounding him suggests that there was none that could challenge his predominance.

*All excerpts have been taken from Imperial Tragedy: From Constantine’s Empire to the Destruction of Roman Italy, AD 363-568, Profile Books Ltd.

On Grand Strategy – B.H. Liddell Hart

Synopsis:

B.H. Liddell Hart defines grand strategy – vis-à-vis international affairs – within a context of so-called acquisitive and conservative states. Acquisitive states tend to be predatory, whereas conservative states lean on deterrence as their vital center of policy. Likewise, Liddell Hart stresses economy of force as a keystone of success for both types of states.

Excerpts:

“Whereas strategy is only concerned with the problem of ‘winning the war’, grand strategy must take a longer view – for its problem is the winning of the peace. Such an order of thought is not the matter of ‘putting the cart before the horse’, but but of being clear as to where the horse and cart are going.

“Another conclusion which develops from the study of grand strategy, against the background of history, is the practical necessity of adapting the general theory of strategy to the nature of a nation’s fundamental policy.

“Victory in the true sense implies that the state peace, and of one’s people, is better after the war than before. Victory in this sense is only possible if a quick result can be gained or if a long effort can be economically proportioned to the national resources.

“The less that a nation has regard for moral obligations the more it tends to respect physical strength – the deterrent power of a force too strong to be challenged with impunity.

“It is folly to imagine that the aggressive types, whether individuals or nations, can be bought off – or, in modern language, ‘appeased’ – since the payment of danegeld stimulates a demand for more danegeld. But they can be curbed. Their very belief in force makes them more susceptible to the deterrent effect of a formidable opposing force.

*All excerpts have been taken from Strategy, BN Publishing.