Tag: International Politics

Strategy for an Atomic Monopoly – Lawrence Freedman and Jeffrey Michaels

Synopsis:

Fusion of early application and tactical surprise – vis-à-vis nuclear weapons – tended to define American strategic thinking throughout its brief era of atomic monopoly. The concept of a so-called ‘atomic blitz’ synthesized rapid deployment with operational ends via the rear industrial areas of an enemy. Further, the blitz sought to counterbalance conventional superiority by swiftly degrading war making capacity in order to weaken adversary morale.

Excerpts:

“American and British negotiators were finding the US demobilization in conventional forces a chronic weakness in diplomatic confrontations with the Soviet Union, given the latter’s imposing military presence in Central and Eastern Europe, for which possession of the atom bomb provided scant compensation.

“The deteriorating international situation and sentiment discovered by Forrestal for an explicit emphasis on atom bombs in US strategy was reinforced by a growing belief among the military that these bombs could be used to decisive effect in the early stages of a war.

“Marxism-Leninism created confidence in the ultimate victory, while admitting the possibility of severe setbacks which could be extremely unpleasant for those unfortunate to be representing the cause at the wrong moment of history.

“Major-General Isayev criticized pre-war military thinking in capitalist countries which ‘displayed an erratic and extravagant predilection for one-sided development, now of the air force (Douhet), now of the tank force (Fuller), and to underestimate the importance of the artillery, infantry and other services’.

“Stalin propounded the doctrine of the ‘Permanently Operating Factors’. This was not challenged until his death. War was seen as a massive clash between two societies, in which all the strengths and weaknesses of the belligerents influenced the final result.

*All excerpts have been taken from The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Palgrave Macmillan.

Nature of International Change – Robert Gilpin

Synopsis:

Robert Gilpin’s analysis of international affairs in War & Change in World Politics tends to hinge on two vital benchmarks. First, consensus operates as a cohesive glue for constructing equilibrium between the most powerful states. Second, hegemonic influence is the most potent prime mover for developing consensus vis-à-vis international politics. In this way, equilibrium within international affairs is dynamic and fluid relative to change.

Excerpts:

“A precondition for political change lies in a disjuncture between the existing social system and the redistribution of power toward those actors who would benefit most from a change in the system.

“As is the case with domestic society, the nature of the international system determines whose interests are being served by the functioning of the system. Changes in the system imply changes in the distribution of benefits provided to and costs imposed on individual members by the system.

“In a diplomatic conflict the country which yields is likely to suffer in prestige because the fact of yielding is taken by the rest of the world to be evidence of conscious weakness… If they show want of confidence, people infer that there is some hidden source of weakness.

“Yet, even the most ruthless dictator must satisfy the interests of those individuals and groups who also wield power in a society. Powerful groups set constraints on and may even determine the actions of state authority. They constitute the society that is protected by the state; their particular concept of justice reigns.

“The maximization of efforts to attain economic and welfare goals entails the diversion of resources from national security. In a world of scarce resources, where every benefit entails a cost, societies seldom, if ever, choose guns or better, at least over the long run.

*All excerpts have been taken from War & Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press.

The Strategic Dimension – Colin S. Gray

Synopsis:

Colin Gray’s analysis of the so-called strategic dimension of conflict is a multilayered approach – which recognizes at least seventeen dimensions of strategy. According to Gray, the essentials of human culture animate the vital center of the strategic dimension. Further, Gray’s strategic dimension synthesizes with John Keegan’s cultural prime mover of strategy notion for a more refined recognition of how assumptions influence strategic thinking.

Excerpts:

“Politicians and their advisers are experts at crafting policy, just as soldiers have traditionally been viewed as the professionals in ‘the management of violence.’ Who is it, though, that patrols the no-man’s land between politics and military force? That is the realm where strategists should roam.

“Although it may appear unduly pessimistic, even uncharitable, to say it, the evidence of history strongly suggests that we will fail to anticipate the strategic ideas some of our enemies will employ. As a result, we will be embarrassed and, possibly, even defeated occasionally. Such is strategic history.

“Those theorists and officials who persistently confuse the character of war, which is always changing, with the nature of war, which cannot alter, are responsible for creating confusion and raising false expectations.

“Americans must be true to their culture. The conduct of a technological style of warfare is mandated by American circumstances and preferences: It is what Americans do well, and it is usually sensible to go with one’s strengths. The danger is that America’s romance with high technology might distort its understanding of war and strategy.

“In the twentieth century, Germany proved itself to be exceptionally good at fighting. But it repeatedly fell in its inability to translate that combat prowess into an ability to win wars. A world community uneasily dependent upon America’s strategic performance as sheriff has to hope that their guardian state will not reveal any like tendency to win battles but lose wars. That community must also hope that America will remember that the purpose of war is not victory, but the achievement of a condition of peace with security superior to the pre-war context.

*All excerpts have been taken from The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order, The University Press of Kentucky.