Synopsis:
Fusion of early application and tactical surprise – vis-à-vis nuclear weapons – tended to define American strategic thinking throughout its brief era of atomic monopoly. The concept of a so-called ‘atomic blitz’ synthesized rapid deployment with operational ends via the rear industrial areas of an enemy. Further, the blitz sought to counterbalance conventional superiority by swiftly degrading war making capacity in order to weaken adversary morale.
Excerpts:
“American and British negotiators were finding the US demobilization in conventional forces a chronic weakness in diplomatic confrontations with the Soviet Union, given the latter’s imposing military presence in Central and Eastern Europe, for which possession of the atom bomb provided scant compensation.
“The deteriorating international situation and sentiment discovered by Forrestal for an explicit emphasis on atom bombs in US strategy was reinforced by a growing belief among the military that these bombs could be used to decisive effect in the early stages of a war.
“Marxism-Leninism created confidence in the ultimate victory, while admitting the possibility of severe setbacks which could be extremely unpleasant for those unfortunate to be representing the cause at the wrong moment of history.
“Major-General Isayev criticized pre-war military thinking in capitalist countries which ‘displayed an erratic and extravagant predilection for one-sided development, now of the air force (Douhet), now of the tank force (Fuller), and to underestimate the importance of the artillery, infantry and other services’.
“Stalin propounded the doctrine of the ‘Permanently Operating Factors’. This was not challenged until his death. War was seen as a massive clash between two societies, in which all the strengths and weaknesses of the belligerents influenced the final result.
*All excerpts have been taken from The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Palgrave Macmillan.
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