Tag: JFC Fuller

Alexander’s Generalship – JFC Fuller

Synopsis:

JFC Fuller synthesizes the strategic as well as tactical insights of Carl von Clausewitz and Napoleon in order to define the generalship of Alexander the Great. Within this context, Fuller identifies seven elements which operate as a bridging device between Alexander’s tactical and strategic aims – i.e. aim or object, security, mobility, offensive power, economy of force, concentration of force, and surprise. Finally, Alexander’s political leadership – internal as well as external – advanced a type of fusion among his military and political aims.

Excerpts:

“When Alexander took the field, he was both the thinking and fighting head of his army.

“In his many battles his tactical genius is apparent in the lightning-like speed with which he adapted his actions to novel circumstances; he never copied his former successes, and this was the main reason why success followed success.

“Although he was always ready to attempt the seemingly impossible, he was just as ready to avoid the obviously unprofitable.

“In all his campaigns it was the same; his strategical aim was subordinated to his political aim, and his tactical aim to his strategical aim, and the result was systematic and methodical conquest.

“While the aim of his strategy was to win great battles, the aim of his policy was to pacify and not antagonize his enemy, so as to limit the number of battles he would have to fight.

*All excerpts have been taken from The Generalship of Alexander the Great, Da Capo Press.

Strategy for an Atomic Monopoly – Lawrence Freedman and Jeffrey Michaels

Synopsis:

Fusion of early application and tactical surprise – vis-à-vis nuclear weapons – tended to define American strategic thinking throughout its brief era of atomic monopoly. The concept of a so-called ‘atomic blitz’ synthesized rapid deployment with operational ends via the rear industrial areas of an enemy. Further, the blitz sought to counterbalance conventional superiority by swiftly degrading war making capacity in order to weaken adversary morale.

Excerpts:

“American and British negotiators were finding the US demobilization in conventional forces a chronic weakness in diplomatic confrontations with the Soviet Union, given the latter’s imposing military presence in Central and Eastern Europe, for which possession of the atom bomb provided scant compensation.

“The deteriorating international situation and sentiment discovered by Forrestal for an explicit emphasis on atom bombs in US strategy was reinforced by a growing belief among the military that these bombs could be used to decisive effect in the early stages of a war.

“Marxism-Leninism created confidence in the ultimate victory, while admitting the possibility of severe setbacks which could be extremely unpleasant for those unfortunate to be representing the cause at the wrong moment of history.

“Major-General Isayev criticized pre-war military thinking in capitalist countries which ‘displayed an erratic and extravagant predilection for one-sided development, now of the air force (Douhet), now of the tank force (Fuller), and to underestimate the importance of the artillery, infantry and other services’.

“Stalin propounded the doctrine of the ‘Permanently Operating Factors’. This was not challenged until his death. War was seen as a massive clash between two societies, in which all the strengths and weaknesses of the belligerents influenced the final result.

*All excerpts have been taken from The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Palgrave Macmillan.