Tag: Ends

On Ends and Means – Karl von Clausewitz

Synopsis:

Karl von Clausewitz’s prime mover – and central node – in warfare is the political object, which may operate within a fluid context. Further, the context rides on Clausewitz’s trinitarian categorical dynamic within a state – i.e. military forces, country, and will of the enemy. In this way, the political object ought to be synergistic with the trinity for a state to be successful in war.

Excerpts:

“If we ask, first of all, what is the aim toward which the whole war must be directed so as to be the proper means for attaining the political object, we shall find that this is just as variable as are the political object and the particular circumstances of the war.

“In the plan of war, we shall consider more closely what disarming a state means, but we must here distinguish between three general categories which include everything else. They are the military forces, the country and the will of the enemy.

“But the disarming of the enemy – this object of war in the abstract, this final means of attaining the political object, in which all other means are included – does not always occur in practice and is not a necessary condition to peace. Therefore it cannot be set up in theory as a law.

“In wars in which the one side cannot completely disarm the other, the motives to peace will rise and fall on both sides according to the probability of success and the required expenditure of force.

“If we want to overcome the enemy by outlasting him in the struggle, we must content ourselves with small objects, for naturally a great object requires a greater expenditure of forces than a small one. However, the smallest object we can propose is pure resistance, a combat without any positive intention.

*All excerpts have been taken from War, Politics, and Power, Regnery Publishing, Inc.

On Doctrine – Harry G. Summers Jr.

Synopsis:

In his analysis of the Vietnam War, Harry G. Summers Jr. advances the notion of American strategy as doctrinally deficient via a cloud of confusion. Following the Korean War, the definition of limited war became increasingly fluid. In this way, means and ends became confused – which tended to influence all levels of war.

Excerpts:

“In World War II this linkage dropped out of our war theories, for the national aim was no longer forcing the enemy ‘to sue for peace’ but rather his unconditional surrender. The destruction of the enemy’s armed forces were therefore no longer means to an end so much as an end in itself.

“The U.S. strategy in Korea after the Chinese intervention was not so much one of limiting the means as it was one of tailoring the political ends so that they could be accomplished within the military means that our political leaders were willing to expend.

“Defining victory only in terms of total victory, rather than more accurately as the attainment of the objectives for which the war is waged, was a strategic mistake.

“But even though we dropped victory as an aim in war, the overall doctrinal effects of our Korean war experience were beneficial. As a result of that war we shed our World War II delusions about total war.

“In like manner the polarity with China was also weakened by our publicly expressed fears of becoming involved in a land war in Asia. This lack of polarity was to lead us into an untenable strategic position where the enemy’s territory was inviolable while the territory of our ally was open to attack.

*All excerpts have been taken from On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio Press.

Afterword on Strategy – Richard Hart Sinnreich

Synopsis:

In the afterword of his authoritative book on successful military strategies throughout history, Richard Hart Sinnreich synthesizes the most enduring lessons learned. He concludes the successful application of strategy to be most dependent on the identification of individual strategic genius, as well as what may be described as learning institutions – which are adaptive, and anticipatory of novel strategic thinking.

Excerpts:

“Not all strategic failures reflect overextension. They are equally likely – perhaps more likely – to reflect mistaken theories of success.

“Above all, strategic success is hostage to the willingness of political and military leaders to read and heed the evidence of the battlefield even at the price of jettisoning cherished assumptions.

“To be successful, long-term strategy requires both an accurate prompting diagnosis and the discipline to conform action to intention over time. Its greatest risk is target fixation – the failure to honor the evidence of the evolving environment when it begins to refute assumptions on which the strategy rested.

“Weak states, like weak armies, may prevail for a time over stronger but less clever adversaries. But unless cleverness can be translated into effective military power, a stronger contestant sooner or later will prevail absent a failure of political will.

“In the end, sustaining the nation’s determination to prevail is the crucial hallmark of any successful military strategy.

*All excerpts have been taken from Successful Strategies: Triumphing in War and Peace from Antiquity to the Present, Cambridge University Press.