Tag: American Diplomacy

Presidential Power – Richard Nixon

Synopsis:

Diplomacy signals the sine qua non of Richard Nixon’s vision of presidential power. Within Nixon’s diplomatic power construct, unpredictability, informal negotiations, as well as so-called linkage tend to sub-unify and amplify presidential power-projection vis-à-vis international politics. Similarly, Nixon advances ten diplomatic guide-posts to anchor presidential power.

Excerpts:

“When saying ‘always’ and ‘never,’ always keep a mental reservation; never foreclose the unique exception; always leave room for maneuver. ‘Always’ and ‘never’ are guideposts, but in high-stakes diplomacy there are few immutables. A President always has to be prepared for what he thought he would never do.

“Diplomacy often requires a delicate and intricate balancing of ambiguity and straight talk, the unpredictable and the very predictable. A complex game is played out between adversaries, a game that involves, or should involve, the least amount of guesswork on the part of the other side.

“The United States is an open society. We have all but one of our cards face up on the table. Our only covered card is the will, nerve, and unpredictability of the President – his ability to make the enemy think twice about raising the ante.

“Diplomacy can be used either as a sword or as a needle – as a weapon or an instrument of union. In dealing with allies the President is chiefly engaged in mending tears and strengthening seams.

“The difference between meeting with friends and meeting with adversaries can best be summarized this way. When you talk to your adversaries you learn about them. When you talk to your friends you learn from them.

*All excerpts have been taken from The Real War, Warner Books Inc.

Keeping a World Intact – George F. Kennan

Synopsis:

George Kennan’s book Russia and the West chronicles early Soviet international politics under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin as well as Joseph Stalin. Russian diplomacy vis-à-vis the West is the emphasis, and Kennan offers keen analysis concerning Soviet intentionality. In his final chapter “Keeping a World Intact,” Kennan endeavors to harmonize points of friction with geopolitical realism to construct a workable American/Soviet diplomatic model for the Cold War.

Excerpts:

“Stalin was a dangerous man to the end; and almost to the end, he remained unchallenged in his authority. But the men around him served him, throughout those final years, in a sullen, guarded silence, expecting nothing and waiting only for the hand of Time to take him.

“By this opposition to the very institutions of the West, the Russian Communists offered to the will of the Western peoples a species of defiance for which they have had no patent other than their own unlimited intellectual arrogance.

“Russian governments have always been difficult governments to do business with. This is nothing new in kind – if anything is new about it – it is only a matter of degree.

“People who have only enemies don’t know what complications are; for that, you have to have friends; and these, the Soviet government, thank God, now has.

“The first to go, in my opinion, should be self-idealization and the search for absolutes in world affairs: for absolute security, absolute amity, absolute harmony. We are a strong nation, wielding great power. We cannot help wielding this power. It comes to us by virtue of our sheer size and strength, whether we wish it or not.

*All excerpts have been taken from Russia and the West: Under Lenin and Stalin, Mentor Book.