Tag: International Relations

On Institutional Order – G. John Ikenberry

Synopsis:

G. John Ikenberry tends to define institutional order vis-à-vis a tri-causal dynamic. First, a hegemonic power advances a postwar international order using consent and consensus networks. Second, the networks bind institutions via a process of ‘consultation and participation’ – which crystalizes over time. Finally, the leading power locks in favorable – as well as credible – arrangements, which extend beyond its power zenith.

Excerpts:

“The greater the postwar disparities in power, the more opportunities the leading state has to lock in a favorable order, and the more weaker and secondary states will be attracted to institutional agreements that lower the risks of domination or abandonment.

“A second reason why weaker states might opt for the institutional agreement is that if the leading state is able credibly to demonstrate strategic restraint the others buy protection against the threat of domination or abandonment.

“The constitutional settlement involves a bargain: the leading state gets a predictable and legitimate order based on agreed-upon rules and institutions. It obtains the acquiescence in this order by weaker states, which in turn allows it to conserve its power.

“Institutional agreements do shape and constrain the policy options of states and put some general parameters on the distribution of gains; indeed, this is why ordering institutions are attractive to both leading and weaker states.

“Binding institutions create constraints on the way power can be used in the system, thereby rendering asymmetric power relations less exploitative and commitment more certain. The returns to power are reduced.

*All excerpts have been taken from After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, & the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton University Press.

Nature of International Change – Robert Gilpin

Synopsis:

Robert Gilpin’s analysis of international affairs in War & Change in World Politics tends to hinge on two vital benchmarks. First, consensus operates as a cohesive glue for constructing equilibrium between the most powerful states. Second, hegemonic influence is the most potent prime mover for developing consensus vis-à-vis international politics. In this way, equilibrium within international affairs is dynamic and fluid relative to change.

Excerpts:

“A precondition for political change lies in a disjuncture between the existing social system and the redistribution of power toward those actors who would benefit most from a change in the system.

“As is the case with domestic society, the nature of the international system determines whose interests are being served by the functioning of the system. Changes in the system imply changes in the distribution of benefits provided to and costs imposed on individual members by the system.

“In a diplomatic conflict the country which yields is likely to suffer in prestige because the fact of yielding is taken by the rest of the world to be evidence of conscious weakness… If they show want of confidence, people infer that there is some hidden source of weakness.

“Yet, even the most ruthless dictator must satisfy the interests of those individuals and groups who also wield power in a society. Powerful groups set constraints on and may even determine the actions of state authority. They constitute the society that is protected by the state; their particular concept of justice reigns.

“The maximization of efforts to attain economic and welfare goals entails the diversion of resources from national security. In a world of scarce resources, where every benefit entails a cost, societies seldom, if ever, choose guns or better, at least over the long run.

*All excerpts have been taken from War & Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press.

The Case for General Theory – Colin S. Gray

Synopsis:

Published near the end of his life Theory of Strategy presents Colin Gray’s general theory of strategy. The theory is split into four components involving ideas relevant to politics, order, complexity, and cohesion, as well as two sub-categories which survey the significance of history and what may be described as strategic intuition.

Excerpts:

“As a general rule, the armed forces need to be able and willing to do it – whatever ‘it’ is – tactically, if operational art, strategy, and high policy are to be feasible.

“Unfortunately, there has been only one long-term pattern in human affairs, and that is a perpetual readiness to resort to conflict. Regardless of the character of the political, religious, and pseudo-religious ideas that have inspired the human historical narrative, this has been its single, and therefore master, theme….A theory of strategy claiming to be general, as here, needs to be housed firmly and plausibly in a resilient basis of causal explanation.

“The search for security must lead inexorably to a quest for strategy. It is solely through strategy that military power can be translated into political influence. This influence is the currency in which security is valued.

“Strategy is in the currency-conversion business, turning military power into political influence. The general theory of strategy is entirely indifferent as to the means employed to achieve this conversion. In practice, of course, the ways in which chosen means are used are often critical to the success or otherwise of the whole conversion enterprise. It can be important to emphasize to an army that, although vitally necessary, it is only a means to an end that is political by definition.

“The theory of war needs to be nested richly within a context of broad understanding of the likely consequences of conflict.

*All excerpts have been taken from Theory of Strategy, Oxford University Press.