Synopsis:
Edward Luttwak’s survey of ancient Chinese strategic wisdom elevates a tendency within Han culture toward intercultural egoism vis-à-vis external actors. In this way, Han strategic guidance advances a trend of deficiency relative to how external actors may react to Chinese action. Further, a solid reliance on anecdotes within classic Chinese strategic texts removes the opportunity for systematic analysis.
Excerpts:
“The first detectable residue of the Warring States/Art of War mentality, or rather of the misapplication of intracultural norms to intercultural conflict, is the presumption of unlimited pragmatism in inter-state relations.
“A second and related residue of misapplied Art of War intracultural norms that distorts China’s conduct is potentially much more dangerous. This is the tendency of Chinese officialdom to believe that long-unresolved disputes with foreign countries can be resolved by deliberately provoking crises, to force negotiations that will settle the dispute.
“Again, the purpose of these provocations is not to escalate toward war, but rather to create crisis conditions meant to force the other side to focus on the issue, to finally resolve it by serious negotiations.
“Hence, Chinese faith in clever Warring States statecraft, to gain much with just a little violence, an almost symbolic bold stroke perhaps, might collide catastrophically with an altogether more violent American response.
“Chinese foreign policy evidently presumes that foreign states can be just as practical and opportunistic in their dealings with China.
*All excerpts have been taken from The Rise of China vs. The Logic of Strategy, Harvard University Press.
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