Tag: Geostrategy

On Institutional Order – G. John Ikenberry

Synopsis:

G. John Ikenberry tends to define institutional order vis-à-vis a tri-causal dynamic. First, a hegemonic power advances a postwar international order using consent and consensus networks. Second, the networks bind institutions via a process of ‘consultation and participation’ – which crystalizes over time. Finally, the leading power locks in favorable – as well as credible – arrangements, which extend beyond its power zenith.

Excerpts:

“The greater the postwar disparities in power, the more opportunities the leading state has to lock in a favorable order, and the more weaker and secondary states will be attracted to institutional agreements that lower the risks of domination or abandonment.

“A second reason why weaker states might opt for the institutional agreement is that if the leading state is able credibly to demonstrate strategic restraint the others buy protection against the threat of domination or abandonment.

“The constitutional settlement involves a bargain: the leading state gets a predictable and legitimate order based on agreed-upon rules and institutions. It obtains the acquiescence in this order by weaker states, which in turn allows it to conserve its power.

“Institutional agreements do shape and constrain the policy options of states and put some general parameters on the distribution of gains; indeed, this is why ordering institutions are attractive to both leading and weaker states.

“Binding institutions create constraints on the way power can be used in the system, thereby rendering asymmetric power relations less exploitative and commitment more certain. The returns to power are reduced.

*All excerpts have been taken from After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, & the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton University Press.

Diplomacy and War in Livy – Niccolo Machiavelli

Synopsis:

Niccolo Machiavelli’s discourses on Titus Livy’s history of Rome offers a full spectrum examination of Roman statecraft. In book two, Machiavelli submits his analysis of war and diplomacy vis-à-vis Rome’s interaction with its allies – as well as enemies. Proximity, clarity, and swift resolve are features recognized as desirable for an ally.

Excerpts:

“Leagues made with rulers who lack either the means to help because they are too far away, or the power to help because they are disorganized or for other reasons, bring rather repute than assistance to those who trust in them.

“The advice which Hannibal gave to Antiochus, when this monarch was contemplating a war with the Romans. The Romans, he argued, could only be beaten in Italy, for others might there be able to avail themselves of their arms, their riches and their allies… he ended by saying that Antiochus had better first try to take Rome before attacking the empire, and Italy before attacking the other provinces.

“The Cimbri broke up a Roman army in Germany, and the Romans had no way to repair their defeat. But, when the Cimbri arrived in Italy, and against them the Romans could bring all their forces to bear, they were undone.

“I say again that a ruler who has his people well armed and equipped for war, should always wait at home to wage war with a powerful and dangerous enemy, and should not go out to meet him; but that one who has ill-armed subjects and a country unused to war should always meet the enemy as far away from home as he can.

“Slow and tardy decisions are no less harmful than are ambiguous decisions, especially when the point at issue is whether support is to be given to an ally; for by such slowness nobody benefits and to oneself it does harm.

*All excerpts have been taken from Machiavelli: The Discourses, Penguin Books Ltd.

American Strategic Culture – Colin S. Gray

Synopsis:

Published in 1988, Colin Gray’s The Geopolitics of Super Power examines the cultural and political dimensions of late Cold War era American geostrategy. Context, as well as comparison guide Gray’s analytical framework – which synthesizes geography and history. According to Gray, political geography catalyzes a vital feature of national strategic culture.

Excerpts:

“It is commonplace to observe that dictatorships maintain systemic political strength only in the context of a public aura of success; that is, given that it is the lot of all governments to receive and be responsible for both good and bad news, a dictatorship dares not admit that it has failed.

“The roots of American strategic culture lie in a frontier tradition, an experience and expectation of success in national endeavors, experience with an abundance of resources for defense, a dominant political philosophy of liberal idealism, and a sense of separateness – moral and geostrategic – from the evil doings of the Old World.

“But statecraft is at least as much a matter of discovering and exploiting effective ‘work-arounds’ for national weaknesses and vulnerabilities as it is of exploiting national strengths. Substantially, though not exclusively, the effectiveness of a particular security community in defense of its interests is a function of the quality of strategic guidance provided for sustained collective action.

“Strategic culture – the socially transmitted attitudes, habits, and skills of a community in its approach to issues of national security – is very much the product of geopolitical factors as they are locally interpreted.

“Technical fixes in defense organization, and even changes in military tactics and at the operational level of war, will be unlikely to have the desired effects if they affront important strands in American culture.

*All excerpts have been taken from The Geopolitics of Super Power, The University Press of Kentucky.