Category: Diplomatic Strategy

On Institutional Order – G. John Ikenberry

Synopsis:

G. John Ikenberry tends to define institutional order vis-à-vis a tri-causal dynamic. First, a hegemonic power advances a postwar international order using consent and consensus networks. Second, the networks bind institutions via a process of ‘consultation and participation’ – which crystalizes over time. Finally, the leading power locks in favorable – as well as credible – arrangements, which extend beyond its power zenith.

Excerpts:

“The greater the postwar disparities in power, the more opportunities the leading state has to lock in a favorable order, and the more weaker and secondary states will be attracted to institutional agreements that lower the risks of domination or abandonment.

“A second reason why weaker states might opt for the institutional agreement is that if the leading state is able credibly to demonstrate strategic restraint the others buy protection against the threat of domination or abandonment.

“The constitutional settlement involves a bargain: the leading state gets a predictable and legitimate order based on agreed-upon rules and institutions. It obtains the acquiescence in this order by weaker states, which in turn allows it to conserve its power.

“Institutional agreements do shape and constrain the policy options of states and put some general parameters on the distribution of gains; indeed, this is why ordering institutions are attractive to both leading and weaker states.

“Binding institutions create constraints on the way power can be used in the system, thereby rendering asymmetric power relations less exploitative and commitment more certain. The returns to power are reduced.

*All excerpts have been taken from After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, & the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton University Press.

Presidential Power – Richard Nixon

Synopsis:

Diplomacy signals the sine qua non of Richard Nixon’s vision of presidential power. Within Nixon’s diplomatic power construct, unpredictability, informal negotiations, as well as so-called linkage tend to sub-unify and amplify presidential power-projection vis-à-vis international politics. Similarly, Nixon advances ten diplomatic guide-posts to anchor presidential power.

Excerpts:

“When saying ‘always’ and ‘never,’ always keep a mental reservation; never foreclose the unique exception; always leave room for maneuver. ‘Always’ and ‘never’ are guideposts, but in high-stakes diplomacy there are few immutables. A President always has to be prepared for what he thought he would never do.

“Diplomacy often requires a delicate and intricate balancing of ambiguity and straight talk, the unpredictable and the very predictable. A complex game is played out between adversaries, a game that involves, or should involve, the least amount of guesswork on the part of the other side.

“The United States is an open society. We have all but one of our cards face up on the table. Our only covered card is the will, nerve, and unpredictability of the President – his ability to make the enemy think twice about raising the ante.

“Diplomacy can be used either as a sword or as a needle – as a weapon or an instrument of union. In dealing with allies the President is chiefly engaged in mending tears and strengthening seams.

“The difference between meeting with friends and meeting with adversaries can best be summarized this way. When you talk to your adversaries you learn about them. When you talk to your friends you learn from them.

*All excerpts have been taken from The Real War, Warner Books Inc.