Synopsis:
Institutions, systems, as well as enduring strategic principles tend to define the Jominian approach to military policy. In this way, Jomini’s tri-causal formula endeavors to allay the development of ineffective military policy via a systematic application of known effective military practices. Further, Jominian institutions – and systems – operate top-down as well as bottom-up to increase strategic effectiveness across a broad spectrum.
Excerpts:
“Military policy may be said to embrace all the combinations of any projected war, except those relating to the diplomatic art and strategy.
“Experience has constantly proved that a mere multitude of brave men armed to the teeth make neither a good army nor a national defense.
“A good army commanded by a general of ordinary capacity may accomplish great feats; a bad army with a good general may do equally well; but an army will certainly do a great deal more if its own superiority and that of the general be combined.
“Strategy alone will remain unaltered, with its principles the same as under the Scipios and Caesars, Frederick and Napoleon, since they are independent of the nature of the arms and the organization of the troops.
“If the prince has not a military education it will be very difficult for him to fulfill his duty in this respect. In this case – which is, unfortunately, of too frequent occurrence – the defect must be supplied by wise institutions, at the head of which are to be placed a good system of the general staff, a good system of recruiting, and a good system of national reserves.
*All excerpts have been taken from The Art of War, BiblioBazaar.
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