Synopsis:
G. John Ikenberry tends to define institutional order vis-à-vis a tri-causal dynamic. First, a hegemonic power advances a postwar international order using consent and consensus networks. Second, the networks bind institutions via a process of ‘consultation and participation’ – which crystalizes over time. Finally, the leading power locks in favorable – as well as credible – arrangements, which extend beyond its power zenith.
Excerpts:
“The greater the postwar disparities in power, the more opportunities the leading state has to lock in a favorable order, and the more weaker and secondary states will be attracted to institutional agreements that lower the risks of domination or abandonment.
“A second reason why weaker states might opt for the institutional agreement is that if the leading state is able credibly to demonstrate strategic restraint the others buy protection against the threat of domination or abandonment.
“The constitutional settlement involves a bargain: the leading state gets a predictable and legitimate order based on agreed-upon rules and institutions. It obtains the acquiescence in this order by weaker states, which in turn allows it to conserve its power.
“Institutional agreements do shape and constrain the policy options of states and put some general parameters on the distribution of gains; indeed, this is why ordering institutions are attractive to both leading and weaker states.
“Binding institutions create constraints on the way power can be used in the system, thereby rendering asymmetric power relations less exploitative and commitment more certain. The returns to power are reduced.
*All excerpts have been taken from After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, & the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton University Press.
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